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This reflection draws on the judgment handed down by the European Court on Human 
Rights (hereinafter the ‘ECtHR’ or ‘Court’) in March 2017 in Elisaveta Talpis v. Italy1 
which concerns States’ positive obligations to counter domestic violence.2 It sheds light 
on the argumentative moves of the Court to eradicate domestic violence through a very 
specific approach of what is relevant for the sake of interpreting States’ legal 
obligations. In particular, it demonstrates that the provisions of the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic 
Violence, adopted in 2011 in Istanbul and entered into force in 2014 (hereinafter 
‘Istanbul Convention’),3 can constitute ‘relevant rules of international law’ under Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties (VCLT) in the 
interpretation of applicable articles of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(hereinafter the ‘European Convention’).  
 
Relying on previous European human rights jurisprudence, I argue that the Court has 
started to use the Istanbul Convention as a key instrument to interpret positive legal 
obligations deriving from the rights enshrined in the European Convention, in particular 
in Article 2 (right to life), and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination). The ECtHR judges 
                                                 
1
 Available in French and Italian. http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{"fulltext":["talpis"],"itemid":["001-171994"]} 
2
 No. 41237/14, 2 March 2017.  
3
 11 May 2011, CETS No.210. State Parties: 22.  
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refer to the preamble and relevant articles of the Istanbul Convention in the Talpis 
judgment as a means to impose a stricter due diligence standard with regard to 
obligations States must comply with in cases of domestic violence. This standard marks 
an improvement of the mechanisms existing at regional level to eradicate domestic 
violence in order to achieve a higher standard of protection for victims.  
 
In its interpretation activities over the years, the Court has not only considered the 
practice of Contracting Parties to the European Convention, but also ‘the evolution in 
the norms and principles applied in international law’ regarding a specific issue, the 
emergence of a ‘common ground in modern societies,’ and the practice which reflects 
States’ common values.4 Through the process of interpretation, the Court clarifies 
general obligations taking into account ‘the state of the law at the time of its 
application.’5 As a result of the Talpis judgment, the State is considered responsible for 
violating rights of the European Convention if it did not adopt measures to prevent 
domestic violence or if it did not intervene in a prompt way, even without the immediacy 
of the risk being proved. What is relevant in this and previous judgments on domestic 
violence is the importance given to a social problem, which according to the Court 
affects society in all Member States and requires a strong response using the European 
Convention as interpreted through the Istanbul Convention.  
 
The reflection is divided into two parts: I will first analyse the Talpis judgment, 
emphasising the important findings of the decision in terms of domestic violence (1). I 
will then demonstrate to what extent the provisions of the Istanbul Convention can 
constitute relevant rules of international law in the interpretation of the European 
Convention with the purpose of identifying States’ legal obligations in preventing 
domestic violence (2).  
 
                                                 
4
 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, No. 34503/97, 12 November 2008, para. 85. 
5
 Report Fragmentation of International Law, Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006, para. 478 
(b).  See also M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties’, 21 The Hague Yearbook of 
International Law (2008) 101.  
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1. The Evolution of Positive Obligations in Combating Domestic Violence: The 
Talpis Judgment  
The case under analysis concerns gender-based violence against women, which is 
widespread in Italy and is usually perpetrated by a partner or a former partner that leads 
to the death of the woman or a family member who attempts to protect the woman (the 
applicant’s son in the Talpis case). The data confirms that despite having adopted 
recent measures to combat violence or femicide (to kill a woman because she is a 
woman), it has not decreased in Italy and affects women of all ages and of all social 
conditions.  
 
In this specific case, Talpis reported the violent behaviour of her husband to the police 
authorities but they only responded seven months later. After fatally stabbing the 
applicant’s son and attempting to murder the applicant, Talpis’ husband was sentenced 
to life imprisonment. Waiting for the judgment of the domestic courts, Elisaveta Talpis 
filed a complaint with the ECtHR against Italy, claiming the Italian authorities failed to 
protect her and her son from her violent husband.  
 
The Court found, by a majority of six votes to one, that Italy violated Article 2 of the 
European Convention, as a consequence of the death of the applicant’s son and the 
attempted murder of the applicant. The Court unanimously found that the State infringed 
Article 3 of the European Convention (prohibition of torture) due to the failure of the 
authorities to protect the applicant against violence. The Court refused to analyse the 
case under Articles 8 and 13 of the European Convention (the right to respect for 
private and family life and the right to an effective remedy), and found a violation of the 
principle of non-discrimination (Article 14 of the European Convention) by a majority of 
five votes to two.   
 
I will discuss two different aspects6 of the reasoning of the Court, before drawing some 
conclusions based on the general theory of interpretation of international law.  
                                                 
6
 Another interesting element relates to the definition of domestic violence as torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment, which will not be addressed in this contribution.  
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a) Challenging the Osman Test 
With regard to Article 2 of the European Convention, the Court applied the so-called 
‘Osman test’.7 In order to avoid an excessive burden on the authorities, the test 
provides that the positive obligation to protect the right to life requires that the 
authorities ‘knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and 
immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts 
of a third party and that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers 
which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.’8 
According to the majority, the immediacy requirement was met in the Talpis case, 
despite the fact that a year passed between the initial police intervention and the 
murder. 9  Given the circumstances of the case, the Court considered that the husband 
constituted a real threat to the applicant, and that the State had an obligation to adopt 
concrete measures in order to protect the individual whose life was threatened.  
 
In that respect, it seems that a ‘revised Osman test’, as suggested by Judge De 
Albuquerque in the case Valiuliene v. Lithuania,10 has gradually entered the legal 
reasoning of the Court. In this case of domestic violence which caused minor bodily 
injuries to the victim, Judge De Albuquerque acknowledged that the stage of ‘immediate 
risk’ for a victim might be too late for the State to intervene, and that ‘a more rigorous 
standard of diligence is especially necessary’ in societies where the problem of 
domestic violence is widespread. He reformulated the test as follows:  
If a State knows or ought to know that a segment of its population, such as 
women, is subject to repeated violence and fails to prevent harm from befalling 
the members of that group of people when they face a present (but not yet 
imminent) risk, the State can be found responsible by omission for the resulting 
human rights violations. The constructive anticipated duty to prevent and protect 
                                                 
7
 Osman v. United Kingdom, No. 23452/94, 28 October 1998.  
8
 Osman v. United Kingdom, para. 116. 
9
 See the two divergent partly dissenting opinions by Judge Eicke and Judge Spano. The latter in 
particular stressed that the requirement of the immediacy of the risk was not met (para. 11 of the opinion).  
10
 No. 33234/07, 26 March 2013.  
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is the reverse side of the context of widespread abuse and violence already 
known to the State authorities.11 
In the Talpis case, the Court seems to follow the way paved by Judge De Albuquerque, 
where it stressed the ‘particular context’ of domestic violence and the aspect of 
repetition of violent acts12. Similarly, in the O’Keeffe v. Ireland case, concerning child 
abuse in school, the Court stressed the importance of ‘context’ in which the human 
rights violation occurred, based on two elements: the ‘particularly vulnerable nature of 
children,’ and the specific characteristics of primary education.13 In that specific case, 
although being ‘aware of the level of sexual crime by adults against minors,’ Ireland did 
not put in place ‘any mechanism of effective State control against the risks of such 
abuse occurring.’14 Nonetheless, the importance of context and the need to reconsider 
the Osman test cannot justify a disproportionate restriction on other rights.15 As example 
of proportionate measure in the Talpis case, the officials could have driven the 
applicant’s husband to the hospital, or taken him home in order to assess whether the 
situation was safe. 
 
b) Domestic Violence as Discrimination on the Basis of Gender  
The second consideration refers to the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
gender. The Court read Article 14 together with Articles 2 and 3 of the European 
Convention. Referring to Opuz v. Turkey16 and the Eremia v. Moldova,17 the Court 
confirmed that discrimination occurs where it is possible to affirm that the acts of the 
authorities do not only amount to a failure to respond to episodes of violence, but also to 
a ‘repeated tolerance’ that ‘reflect[s] a discriminatory attitude with regard to the applicant 
as woman.’18 Referring to disturbing data on domestic violence in Italy, the Court 
acknowledged first that the phenomenon mainly affects women, and that, despite 
reforms, the rate of femicide has not decreased; secondly, that socio-cultural attitudes 
                                                 
11
 Valiuliene v. Lithuania, p. 31.  
12
 Talpis v. Italy, para. 130.  
13
 O’ Keeffe v. Ireland, No. 35810/09, 28 January 2014, para. 146. 
14
 O’ Keeffe v. Ireland, paras. 162 and 168.  
15
 See Judge Spano, para. 15 of the opinion.  
16
 No. 33401/02, 9 June 2009.  
17
 No. 3564/11, 28 May 2013. 
18
 Talpis v. Italy, para. 141. 
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on domestic violence continue.19  This affirmation differs from the judgment in the 
Rumor case,20 in which the Court posited that the Italian legal framework with regard to 
domestic violence was effective. According to the majority, ‘the circumstances were 
different’21, since the application of Italian criminal law in Talpis did not prevent physical 
assault against the woman. Given the elements of the case, the majority of the judges 
ruled that there was a violation of the prohibition of discrimination.22  
 
2. The Provisions of the Istanbul Convention as ‘Relevant Rules’ of International 
Law 
As interestingly argued, the metaphor of a game perfectly describes the activity of 
interpretation of international law, and those who engage in such an activity have ‘a 
more or less conscious intent to achieve a desired outcome.’23 Article 31(3)(c) VCLT is 
the card that lawyers and courts use in their game, and indeed the ECtHR has referred 
to this provision in order to expand and restrict, for example, the scope of application of 
Article 6 of the European Convention.24 In another case, the Court used a provision of 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with 
regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo Convention)25 as relevant 
international law in order to clarify the content of the right to informed consent.26 To 
mention another illustrative example, the ECtHR relied on the (Revised) European 
Social Charter in a case concerning the application of the freedom of assembly and 
association (Article 11 of the European Convention) to municipal civil servants; in that 
judgment, the Charter was used despite the respondent State being a non-State party.27 
                                                 
19
 Talpis v. Italy, para. 145.  
20
  No. 72964/10, 27 May 2014.  
21
 Talpis v. Italy, para. 146.  
22
 The Court, as stressed by Judge Eicke, has not argued why it considered the Italian system effective in 
the Rumor case, but not in the Talpis judgment.  
23
 A. Bianchi, ‘The Game of Interpretation in International Law’, A. Bianchi, D. Peat, M. Windsor (eds), 
Interpretation in International Law (OUP: Oxford, 2013), p. 54.  
24
 Ibid, pp. 46-47.  
25
 4 April 1997, CETS No.164. 
26
 Evans v. United Kingdom, No. 6339/05, 10 April 2007. F. Seatzu, S. Fanni, ‘The Experience of the 
European Court of Human Rights with the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’, 
31(81) Utrecht Journal of International and European Law (2015) 5.  
27
 Demir and Baykara, cit. See C. Pitea, ‘Interpreting the ECHR in light of ‘Other’ International 
Instruments: Systemic Integration or Fragmentation of Rules of Treaty Interpretation?’, N. Boschiero, T. 
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In RMT v. United Kingdom, the Court referred to the International Labour Organization 
Convention No. 87 and the European Social Charter to conclude that secondary action 
formed part of trade union freedom and therefore could be brought within the terms of 
Article 11 of the European Convention. Other international courts and tribunals have 
considered ‘relevant rules of international law’, both customary and treaty law, as 
means of interpretation.28  
 
In the Talpis case, the Court did not refer to different techniques of interpretation but it 
was well aware of the impact of the Istanbul Convention, where it stated that States – 
ratifying States, in particular, such as Italy, which is party to the Convention as of 2013 –  
have ‘particular’ (particulière) due diligence obligations, and that the peculiarity of acts 
of domestic violence, as acknowledged in the preamble of the Istanbul Convention, 
‘must be taken into account’ during internal proceedings.29 Article 49 of the Istanbul 
Convention provides that ‘Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures 
to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence 
[…] are carried out without undue delay’, and Article 50 is aimed at ensuring that the 
‘responsible law enforcement agencies respond to all forms of violence covered by the 
scope of this Convention promptly and appropriately by offering adequate and 
immediate protection to victims’. These are ‘relevant rules of international law’ that 
matter in analysing violations of articles of the European Convention in cases of 
domestic violence.  
 
I might therefore argue that the ‘Osman test’ with regard to Article 2 of the Convention 
and the due diligence requirement must be read in light of the Istanbul Convention in 
the sense that national authorities must consider the specific conditions of vulnerability 
of the victim, and adopt preventive measures even in the absence of the strict 
requirement of immediacy. In other words, in a situation similar to the one brought 
                                                                                                                                                             
Scovazzi, C. Pitea, C. Ragni (eds), International Courts and the Development of International Law 
(Springer: Berlin, 2013) 545. Cfr. A/CN.4/L.682, para. 472.  
28
 Some examples mentioned by C. MC Lachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention, 54 (2) International Comparative Law Quarterly (2005) 279. In 
particular, the Iran-US Claims Tribunale, and PCA, Ireland v. United Kingdom, final 2 June 2003, 42 ILM 
(2003) 1118.  
29
 Talpis v. Italy, para. 129.  
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before the Court, the immediacy requirement should be satisfied given a ‘present’ risk of 
violence (the fact that the woman found refuge in a shelter for women, that she called 
the police the night of the murder, etc.). The ECtHR is challenging – although not 
explicitly – the Osman test through the Istanbul Convention, considered as ‘relevant rule 
of international law’, and is consequently following the pioneering thought of Judge De 
Albuquerque in the Valiuliene case.  
 
An interesting element that was not analysed either by the Court or the dissenting 
judges is linked to the support States are obliged to give to shelters for victims of 
violence under the Istanbul Convention. The applicant found refuge from her husband 
thanks to a local association. However, the social services of the municipality of Udine 
notified the association that there were no funds available to guarantee the applicant 
another refuge or to pay the refuge found by the association itself. The Government 
counter-argued that the social services in Udine, which had developed a programme for 
victims of violence, were not in charge of the situation and therefore could not pay for 
the applicant’s refuge managed by a private association; the victim should have 
contacted the social services to ask for help.30 In light of the Istanbul Convention, States 
are required to ‘recognise, encourage and support at all levels, the work of relevant non-
governmental organisations and of civil society active […] and establish effective co‐
operation with these organisations’ (Article 9 Istanbul Convention). Even though the 
woman could have reported her situation to the social services, nothing should have 
prevented her from receiving concrete aid from a private association, which, in turn, 
should have been supported by the competent authorities. Therefore, in the application 
of Article 14 of the European Convention, the Court could have held that, despite 
remarkable steps forward in the protection of women from domestic violence, the Italian 
legislative framework and its application by national authorities systematically 
discriminate against women. It does not mean that the Court can assess whether or not 
violations of other international conventions than the European Convention have 
occurred – it would fall outside the scope of its mandate (Article 32 of the European 
Convention) – but that it can interpret the rights protected by the European Convention 
                                                 
30
 Talpis v. Italy, paras 25-26. 
Page 9 of 11 
so as to take into account the evolution of the law and State practice. This could be a 
further step in the consideration of the provisions of the Istanbul Convention as relevant 
rules of international law, to the extent of pushing States to comply with its most 
advanced obligations. Should the situation be different for non-contracting States to the 
Istanbul Convention? As correctly pointed out, the Court ‘does not hesitate to employ 
treaties that are neither binding on all Member States nor binding on the respondent 
State’, hence differentiating its jurisprudence from other international courts and 
tribunals.31  
 
Illuminating in that respect seems to be the concurring opinion of Judge Ziemele in the 
aforementioned O’ Keeffe judgment, where he opined that the reasoning of the majority 
of the judges could have been better supported had it been based on the ‘developments 
in international human rights law to demonstrate that the underlying principle has been 
maintained and has given rise to a detailed set of proposals as to how to ensure (in the 
case at issue) the rights of children.’32 To contextualise, in cases of domestic violence, 
developments have indeed occurred to the extent that States are bound by stricter 
standards of due diligence as the ones elaborated in the Istanbul Convention. To quote 
again Judge Ziemele, ‘the nature of obligations is by definition an evolving concept, 
precisely in conjunction with the evolution of understanding and of means.’33  
My position is more prudent with regard to entirely new obligations, such as the support 
of and the cooperation with non-governmental organisations in countering domestic 
violence. Hence, the interpretation of Article 14 of the European Convention through the 
relevant rule of the Istanbul Convention should be deemed possible only with regard to 
ratifying countries of the latter, such as Italy.  
                                                 
31
 A. Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited: Insights, Good Practices and Lessons to 
be Learned from the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, 28 (4) Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2015) 863. See also M.K. Yasseen, ‘L’interprétation des traités d’après la Convention 
de Vienne sur le droit des traités’, 151 Recueil des Cours (1976) 63, and the panel report on Biotech 
Products (WT/DS291/R, DS292/R, DS293/R), 29 September 2006, para. 7.75: the Cartagena protocol 
was not taken into consideration because none of the parties was a party to the treaty. 
32
 Concurring opinion of Judge Ziemele, O’ Keeffe, para. 9.  
33
 Ibid., para. 10. With regard to Article 31(3)(a) and (b), see Second report on subsequent agreements 
and subsequent practice in relation to the interpretation of treaties by Georg Nolte, A/CN.4/671, 26 March 
2014, para. 56: ‘It is sufficient that the parties, by a subsequent agreement or a subsequent practice 
under article 31 (3), attribute a certain meaning to the treaty, or in other words, adopt a certain 
“understanding” thereof.’ 
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3. Conclusions: New or Old Law Combatting Domestic Violence? 
The Istanbul Convention obliges contracting States to take concrete measures in 
countering violence against women and domestic violence, and can be used by the 
ECtHR judges to interpret the rights granted by the European Convention in terms of 
positive obligations of States. As ‘relevant rules’ of international law, the provisions of 
the Istanbul Convention are useful to expand the scope of application of articles of the 
European Convention which are relevant in cases of domestic violence. Why is the 
Istanbul Convention so relevant? If we consider the number of ratifications, we can 
easily verify that less than half of Member States of the Council of Europe have ratified 
the Convention (23 at the time of writing). Nonetheless, the Convention has not come 
out of the blue. It demonstrates the evolution of European law with regard to domestic 
violence, it endorses the concept of ‘due diligence’ as elaborated by the ECtHR, and it 
identifies specific legal obligations for States parties. It confirms that the issue of 
domestic violence is a high priority in the activity of the Council of Europe, and that 
strong measures must be adopted in order to effectively eradicate it. One author has 
argued that there is no need to invoke Article 31(3)(c) VCLT since there are other rules 
of interpretation that can help, such as systemic and evolutive interpretation.34 However, 
Article 31(3)(c) is in itself a very general principle of treaty interpretation that takes into 
account the fact that ‘treaties are creatures of international law’ and crystalises what 
lawyers and judges always do in the interpretation process.35 
 
In the case under analysis, I can argue that it was the Court that elaborated the Osman 
test, and it can be the Court that can adapt it to the new challenges posed by domestic 
violence, according to an evolutive interpretation that takes into account the 
developments of law and practice. It is the legal space in which ‘relevant rules of 
international law’ have something to say. The ECtHR is not new to this process (Oviedo 
Convention as previously mentioned), and in its forthcoming judgments we might 
reasonably expect a straightforward reference to the provisions of the Istanbul 
Convention as ‘relevant rules of international law’. Even though not all contracting 
                                                 
34
 Rachovitsa, ‘Fragmentation of International Law Revisited’, cit. 
35
 MC Lachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, cit. 
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States to the European Convention have ratified the Istanbul Convention, the current 
‘particularly constructive character’ of evolutive interpretation ‘as it is used’ by the 
ECtHR ‘sometimes anticipates this consensus.’36 The constructive character of this 
interpretation is relevant in particular with regard to the conventions adopted within the 
Council of Europe legal system, to which the Istanbul Convention belongs.  
 
Is this ‘old’ or ‘new’ law? In its report on fragmentation, the International Law 
Commission posited that ‘reference to other rules of international law […] becomes a 
form of secondary evidence supporting the enquiry into science and community values 
and expectations, which the ordinary meaning of the words, and their object and 
purpose, invites.’37 The ECtHR has demonstrated that it considers ‘community values 
and expectations’ when dealing with cases of domestic violence, even to the extent of 
gradually changing the ‘classic’ due diligence standard it has elaborated over time. The 
evolution of the jurisprudence of the Court, acting within the interpretative community of 
law-applying authorities,38 has therefore shown the ‘desired outcome’ of the Court in 
contributing to the eradication of domestic violence in Europe. It is ‘old’ law - the 
European Convention – interpreted using ‘new’ law - the Istanbul Convention - that 
signifies a significant step forward in the protection of women from violence. 
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 J.-M. Sorel, V. Bore-Eveno, ‘Article 31’, in O. Corten, P. Klein (eds), The Vienna Convention on the Law 
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